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of Species, and to remediate the distortions of the his-
tory and role of biostratigraphy that have been and 
continue to be put forth by the proponents of fl ood 
geology, will profi t from these volumes.
Reviewed by Ralph Stearley, Professor of Geology, Calvin College, Grand 
Rapids, MI 49546. 
THE GREAT RIFT: Literacy, Numeracy, and the 
Religion-Science Divide by Michael E. Hobart. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. xiv 
+ 506 pages, with appendices, endnotes, and index. 
Hardcover; $39.95. ISBN: 9780674983632.
Michael Hobart’s book The Great Rift presents a novel 
and provocative perspective on the age-old confl ict 
between religion and science. In his words: 
My central thesis may be baldly and succinctly stated: 
the shift between two distinct information technolo-
gies—literacy and numeracy—resides at the source 
of how science and religion went their separate ways, 
producing the Great Rift between them. (p. 4)
To be clear, Hobart does not specifi cally address 
the alleged discord between science and religion 
but delineates how a chasm (his word) opened up 
to drive them apart. Nevertheless, Hobart holds 
that as life became ever more secularized, religion 
became less relevant to science and was “not so 
much conquered as ignored” (p. 10), so that “from 
the late nineteenth century to our own times we have 
reached the point where observers and participants 
alike … have come to view the widening separation 
between science and religion as an impasse, or even 
a war zone” (p. 323).
To support his thesis, Hobart fl eshes out and refi nes 
some research begun two decades earlier with a col-
league on transitions between the three stages in the 
history of information technology: literacy, numer-
acy, and computerized information processing. The 
result here is a well-researched book, based on a 
lifetime of work, that extensively examines medieval 
and Renaissance developments in mathematics as 
well as Galileo’s seminal role in the rise of modern 
science. The detailed scholarly treatment given these 
topics, which we cannot adequately recapitulate 
here, makes the book well worth its modest price, 
completely aside from its take on the science-religion 
divide.
Hobart begins his narrative with a brief look at the 
ancient world, which introduced and developed 
the information technology of recorded language. 
Greek writing is epitomized by its literature and 
philosophy, which make extensive use of defi nition 
and classifi cation to capture the essence of things. 
Aristotle systematically codifi ed forms of deduc-
tive reasoning based on this type of thinking in his 
logic. Medieval schoolmen later adopted this mode 
of knowledge acquisition in their educational prac-
tices and intellectual debates. Classifi cation and fi ne 
distinctions permeated the writings of those who 
studied the quadrivium (arithmetic, music, geom-
etry, and astronomy) as well as the writings of those 
dedicated to more advanced topics in theology and 
philosophy.
During this time period, there was a methodologi-
cal unity overall to science and religion. Thinkers 
described the observed behavior of natural phe-
nomena in terms of causes related to their essential 
natures, leaving room for divine purposes at the 
head of it all. They employed the same sort of reason-
ing that explained the structure of the natural world 
to incorporate religious ends and means. Science and 
religion in medieval Europe formed a fairly harmo-
nious whole.
As people began to use mathematics more consis-
tently in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance in 
order to relate things in everyday arenas such as 
commercial transactions, music, perspective paint-
ing, and astronomy, the explanatory focus for 
natural phenomena moved away from appealing to 
the intrinsic nature of things to demonstrating how 
they functioned quantitatively. Mathematically relat-
ing numerical features of events or activities via ratio 
and proportion (the rule of three was an omnipres-
ent mainstay) became the new mode of accounting 
for natural phenomena. This approach was fruitfully 
employed by Galileo in his scientifi c analysis of ter-
restrial motion, yielding his times-squared law for 
falling bodies and parabolic paths for projectiles. 
Such an approach left both traditional philosophy 
and theology on the outside, creating a fault line 
between science and religion. Galileo’s clash with 
the Roman Catholic Church over the factual status 
of Copernican astronomy, the nature of scientifi c 
demonstration, and the legitimacy of theological 
incursions into science only exacerbated this rift.
Hobart attributes the new analytic approach in 
natural philosophy to changes in information tech-
nology, indeed, to the rise of numeracy. He sees 
developments within mixed/applied mathematics 
during the Renaissance and early modern period as 
embodying a new understanding of the nature of 
mathematics and the role of symbols. Using terms 
proposed in 1959 by Jagjit Singh (but for distinguish-
ing formalistic late nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
mathematics from its more concrete antecedents), 
Hobart brands classical and medieval mathematics 
as “thing mathematics” and Renaissance and early 
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modern mathematics as “relation mathematics.” This 
characterization works to some extent, but it has 
shortcomings.
Classical mathematics was certainly about mathemat-
ical entities encountered in everyday life (numbers, 
spatial fi gures), but it also treated their basic prop-
erties (being prime, being isosceles) and relations 
(being divisible by, being congruent to). Hobart 
correctly notes that late medieval, Renaissance, and 
early modern mathematics made extensive and 
productive use of relations such as ratio and pro-
portion (a signifi cant part of what qualifi es them as 
being relation mathematics) to formulate functional 
dependencies, but these relations were also promi-
nent in earlier mathematics—in the works of Euclid, 
Archimedes, Apollonius, Heron, and Ptolemy, and 
even in the mathematical practice of earlier cultures. 
Another aspect of the new relation mathematics, 
as Hobart conceptualizes it, is an emphasis on the 
use of abstract or empty symbols. In one sense, this 
was not new. As far back as the end of the third 
millennium BC, for instance, the Mesopotamian 
sexagesimal place-value system made abstract com-
putations possible, so that the differing concrete 
metrological systems still in use could be bypassed. 
But, in another sense, applying this characterization 
to late medieval, Renaissance, and early modern 
mathematics is anachronistic. Hindu-Arabic numer-
als referred to quantities such as goods, weights, and 
monetary value in commercial arithmetics; musical 
notation denoted temporal duration, pitch relations, 
harmonies, and time signatures; and letters used in 
the analysis of motion stood for speeds, times, and 
distances. More-abstract symbols were introduced 
in algebra by Viète and others to stand for numeri-
cal operations as well as unknown and known 
quantities, and these were used to formulate and 
solve equations, but they were not vacuous—they 
had numerical meaning in some assumed domain 
of quantities. Furthermore, while Viète made some 
major notational advances in algebra for solving 
equations prior to 1600, Galileo remained rooted 
in an older geometric form of ratio arithmetic that 
he learned from the recently recovered Book V of 
Euclid’s Elements. In his earlier work, Hobart high-
lighted Viète’s role in the new numeracy, but here 
Galileo is his protagonist. Galileo does use math-
ematical symbolism to analyze relations among 
physical quantities, but these are neither empty of 
meaning nor related by equations.
However, there is some validity to Hobart’s assertion 
that the symbols of modern relation mathematics 
were becoming empty. As mathematics was increas-
ingly being used to quantify empirical realities such 
as cost, distance, harmony, time, speed, and so on, 
time-worn metaphysical and occult connotations of 
numbers and spatial confi gurations became super-
fl uous, and, as a result, symbolic representations 
were emptied of enchanted meaning. This practice 
became more widespread as time went on, though as 
Hobart acknowledges, it was not uniformly followed 
even by the start of the 1600s. Mystical associations 
of mathematics were often deemed as important 
as practical applications; in fact, this development 
encouraged some to believe that mathematics would 
unravel the secrets of nature. Kepler’s astronomical 
writing, for example, contains hard-nosed calcula-
tions about elliptic planetary orbits and also religious 
and mystical ruminations about Platonic solids and 
the ability to think God’s thoughts after him.
More could be said about Hobart’s defense of his 
thesis—particularly his idiosyncratic use of the 
notions of cardinality and ordinality in connection 
with mathematicians beginning to join the fi elds of 
number and space in their practice of mixed math-
ematics—but I will end with a question and follow 
that with a few concluding remarks.
What is gained, I wonder, by conceptualizing the 
transformation of natural philosophy (from using 
Aristotelian teleological argumentation to employing 
mathematical analyses of functional dependencies) 
as a sweeping shift in information technology, 
exchanging words for empty quantitative symbol-
ism? Why is this not seen instead, for instance, as a 
renewed neo-Pythagorean/Archimedean emphasis 
on the primacy of quantifying (mathematization) 
combined with a more experimental and mecha-
nistic bent in physical investigations? That is, why 
concentrate so exclusively on the how of informa-
tion technology—“the humanly constructed screen 
between the knowing mind and the world outside” 
(p. x)—rather than on the what of the discovered 
numerical connections between meaningful content? 
Hobart would no doubt respond that the latter does 
not occur without the former and that his stated aim 
is to determine the extent to which a change in infor-
mation technology is implicated in the new mode of 
doing science, but I think more could have been done 
with developments on the religion and philosophy 
side of the divide to contextualize the shift.
Hobart successfully documents the changing meth-
odology of science in the early modern period, 
especially in his expert examination of Galileo’s 
work, but his thesis does not account for other impor-
tant issues concerning the relationship of science and 
religion, even in this time period. I remain convinced 
that much more than information technologies are 
involved in the rise of modern science and its con-
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nection to religion. To be fair, some of these factors 
are acknowledged in passing by Hobart. He admits 
that changing attitudes toward the roles of religion 
and philosophy in the pursuit of natural knowledge 
were infl uenced by historical developments such as 
the rise of nominalism, the Reformation, Renaissance 
humanism, the revival of Platonism, gradual secular-
ization, and so on, but these lie mostly outside the 
scope of his thesis. More importantly, Hobart does not 
probe the signifi cant ways that Christian religion—in 
both its medieval and early modern versions—pro-
vided a hospitable intellectual environment in which 
modern science could develop and thrive, Galileo’s 
confl ict with the church notwithstanding. Readers 
who recognize God as the author of nature (and of 
creation more broadly) will not be persuaded by 
Hobart’s allegation that “the deep incompatibility 
of religion and science” is now “simply too great to 
overcome” (p. 323). Distinct epistemic methodologies 
or information technologies do not automatically 
create territorial confl icts, and what discord there 
is, can often be attributed to other factors, such as 
the opposition between Christian faith and a strong 
commitment to naturalism.
Reviewed by Calvin Jongsma, Professor of Mathematics Emeritus, Dordt 
College, Sioux Center, IA 51250.
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KNOWING CREATION: Perspectives from Theol-
ogy, Philosophy, and Science by Andrew B. Torrance 
and Thomas H. McCall, eds. Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2018. 341 pages. Paperback; $39.99. ISBN: 
9780310536130. 
The late modern unfurling of interdisciplinary stud-
ies continues to produce innumerable volumes. The 
relationship between theology and science is no 
exception. Zondervan recently released two volumes 
exploring “perspectives from theology, philoso-
phy, and science,” edited by Andrew Torrance and 
Thomas McCall, each with over a dozen qualifi ed 
contributors. The fi rst is Knowing Creation and the 
second Christ and the Created Order. This review looks 
at the fi rst.
As one skims the introduction, it seems the vol-
ume might be just another opinionated survey of 
the stale debates over “creation, science, and intel-
ligent design.” But in reading through each chapter, 
it quickly becomes apparent that the book is far 
broader. In fact, readers generally interested in and 
familiar with this intersection of disciplines might 
fi nd it a simple pleasure to read (as I did), without 
worrying about locating arguments within a contem-
porary context and making judgments. At any rate, 
the book fulfi lls its purpose: to give a microphone to 
the multiplicity of dimensions in this arena, all with-
out reducing or overemphasizing one aspect over 
another. 
It is not possible to review each contribution, but I do 
want to highlight points from some of them to give 
readers a sample of the contents. 
Christoph Schwoebel, in “We Are All God’s 
Vocabulary,” focuses on a topic vital for any dis-
cussion about interacting disciplines: language. 
Although many of us tend to think we understand 
basic concepts such as “metaphor” and “analogy,” 
we often don’t. “Metaphors do not simply add a coat 
of meaning to things which underneath remain what 
they are,” he writes. “They change the way things 
are for us and how we are to relate to them” (p. 49). 
In a modern age that privileges the literal, proposi-
tional, and measurable/quantifi able and downplays 
the symbolic, metaphorical, and qualitative (that is, 
“it’s just a metaphor”), getting a handle on the lin-
guistic dimensions of the science-theology enterprise 
cannot be overstated.1 
Andrew Torrance, in “Not Knowing Creation,” 
attempts to clarify methodological naturalism. 
There’s much to comment on here, but the essay is 
more thoughtful and persuasive than those in Theistic 
Evolution (2017) edited by J. P. Moreland et al. on the 
same topic. Inevitably, there remain loose ends—
especially with regard to the main assumptions of 
this discussion, such as models of God and creation, 
“special divine action,” and how science done by 
Christians is substantially different than that done 
by non-Christians. Torrance writes, for example, that 
“there should be a difference between the way in 
which the Christian scientist and the naturalistic sci-
entist approach and interpret the structure, behavior, 
and history of the natural world” (p. 101); this view 
gets the ball rolling but does not take us too far.
John Walton, in “Origins in Genesis,” condenses 
some of his published research. In contrast to modern 
thought, he presses the superfi ciality of the natural/
supernatural distinction. This default way of think-
ing simply is not part of biblical consciousness. “We 
cannot claim the Bible says something that makes no 
sense in the original context; it cannot make a cat-
egorical distinction if it does not have the categories” 
(p. 109). Walton is by no means the fi rst to make this 
observation, but his repeated focus is justifi ed given 
that many of those speaking and publishing on this 
topic still talk in ignorance; for instance, “miracles” 
are said to be part of the “supernatural” realm (that 
is, where God does stuff) in the Bible whereas “natu-
ral events” are said to be distinct and in the “nature 
